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The Hidden Trump Model 
By Hannah Zontine 
 
Section 1: Background 
 
The majority of poll results published before the Presidential Election predicted Donald 
Trump’s defeat ‘by a landslide’ (Pomarico 2016). On Election Day, in spite of this, he secured 
more than enough electoral votes to win him the presidency. What caused poll results to differ so 
significantly from election results? The sole purpose of polls is to represent the voting intentions 
of the population. Polling every eligible voter would require unfathomable resources; as a result, 
all polls utilize only a sample of the population. Unless pollsters fail to accurately sample from 
the voting population, their results should be similar to the votes each candidate receives. This 
issue came to light when Franklin D. Roosevelt beat Alfred Landon in the 1936 Presidential 
election. Pollsters realized that by conducting the poll explicitly over the phone, they were 
choosing to sample from voters who could afford a house phone; they neglected to poll from an 
accurate sample of the voting population. Since that election, pollsters have aimed to not repeat 
that mistake.  
So what if there is a different effect at work that caused poll results to significantly differ 
from election results? What if people told pollsters their intentions were to vote against Trump, 
but, on election day, voted for him? 
 
Section 1.1 The Bradley Effect 
 
In 1982, the election for California’s next governor was between Tom Bradley and 
George Deukmejian. Bradley, long-time mayor of Los Angeles, was African-American. 
Deukmejian was Caucasian. Bradley led the opinion polls throughout the election; naturally, 
everyone assumed he would win. However, once the votes were counted, Deukmejian was 
revealed the winner. 
After Bradley’s shocking loss, California residents wondered why the poll results differed 
from the election results. One theory persisted: people must have lied to pollsters. The “Bradley 
Effect (BE),” as it is now commonly known, is the “notion that voters overstate their support for 
a black candidate to pollsters for fear of being perceived as racist” (D’Aprile 2008).  
In the early 1990s, Harvard political scientist Dan Hopkins studied the Bradley Effect by 
conducting a large-scale empirical study on it over many different elections. He claimed that the 
BE had a significant effect on the polls. He observed its negative effect on black candidates and 
reported a median gap (i.e. difference between polls and results) of 3.1 percentage points. 
However, after 1996, he found no evidence of the BE influencing any elections and reported a 
median gap of -0.3 percentage points. 
Some speculated the Bradley Effect might have been at work against Barack Obama in 
the 2008 Presidential Election. Not only was he an African American running against a 
Caucasian, but he was the candidate leading in opinion polls. Nevertheless, he ended up winning 
both presidential elections he ran in. 
Empirical evidence of the Bradley Effect rests on individual cases. While typically the 
BE is found to result in the African-American candidate losing, it was observed to have the 
opposite effect on the NYC 1989 mayor race. David Dinkins, an African-American candidate, 
was leading by a few percentage points against Ed Koch, the Caucasian incumbent, in the weeks 
leading up to the election. He ended up winning the election by over 8 percentage points despite 
the opinion polls suggesting a close race. 
There is mixed evidence to support the influence the Bradley Effect can have over any 
type of election. Gary Langer, the director of polling for ABC news, believes the BE to be “a 
theory in search of data” (Wang 2008). 
The Bradley Effect is explicitly about race. However, more generally, polled voters may 
be dishonest to pollsters for a variety of other reasons having to do with the perceived social 
stigma of supporting a certain candidate. In research, we can generalize the BE to all situations in 
which the bias exits. 
 
Section 1.2 Social Desirability Bias 
 
Social psychologists have long been interested in understanding why people lie to their 
friends and family about their true beliefs. They speculate that some people would prefer to lie 
about their opinions than face judgment or rejection from a close associate. 
Social desirability bias​ is a term for the idea that the “basic human tendency to present 
oneself in the best possible light can significantly distort the information gained from 
self-reports” (Maccoby and Maccoby 1954). People are often unwilling to truthfully report their 
beliefs on “sensitive topics for ego-defensive or impression management reasons.” Maccoby and 
Maccoby determined in 1954 that data collected from self-reports is “systematically biased 
toward the respondent’s perceptions of what is socially acceptable.” This phenomenon has been 
found to occur in “virtually all types of self-report measures and across nearly all social sciences 
literatures” (Maccoby and Maccoby 1954). 
 
Section 1.3 The 2016 Presidential Election 
 
The election for the 45​th​ President of the United States took place on November 7, 2016. 
Over 138 million people visited a polling booth that day to submit a ballot (Levine 2016). While 
there were many candidates on the ballot, by far most voted for Hillary Clinton and Donald 
Trump. Clinton, the Democratic nominee, is a former Secretary of State, Senator, and First Lady. 
Trump, the Republican nominee, is an American businessman, television personality, and 
politician.  
Both candidates faced potential charges during their campaign that could have prevented 
them from being elected. For instance, Clinton was being investigated for emailing classified 
information through an unsecure, private server while she was the Secretary of State; however, 
the FBI dropped the investigation, stating “no charges are appropriate in this case” (Comey 
2016). Trump faced multiple allegations of sexual assault, but was never formally charged. 
While many people supported their candidate by publicly advocating for them, some 
people felt pressure not to. This was especially true of Donald Trump. Many of his supporters 
refused to express their voting intentions, because they either felt it would turn away their 
Democratic friends and colleagues or they would be “seen as culturally insensitive” (Simmons 
2017; also see Shepard 2016, Enns & Schuldt 2016). 
During the campaign, the majority of opinion polls predicted Clinton would win the 
election. Nate Silver, a political analyst who accurately predicted how 49 states would vote in the 
2008 election, announced in his final election forecast that Clinton was a “71% favorite” in polls. 
Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist and author, wrote that “Clinton is heading for a decisive 
victory over Donald Trump based on national and swing state polls” (Abramowitz 2016). The 
HuffPost Presidential Forecast Model determined Clinton had a “98.2% chance of winning,” 
while Trump had “no path to an Electoral College victory” (Jackson 2016). The model projected 
Clinton garnering 323 electoral votes and a shift in the Senate to a Democratic majority.  
Trump’s campaign manager, Kellyanne Conway, was among the first to publicly 
speculate that opinion polls weren’t accurately reflecting the amount of support Trump had. In an 
interview with UK “Channel 4” news, she stated that “​it's become socially desirable -- especially 
if you're a college-educated person in the United States of America -- to say that you're against 
Donald Trump” (Wright 2016). According to the campaign’s research, Trump “performs 
consistently better in online polling” (Wright 2016). 
The only major poll to predict Trump’s win was the Daybreak Poll conducted by the LA 
Times. Based on an Internet probability survey, participants were sampled from an ongoing UAS 
(Understanding America Study) panel of 6,000 randomly selected U.S. residents. Selected 
residents who lacked Internet access were provided with some. Every day pollsters asked 1/7th 
of their participants three questions: 1) How likely are you to vote? 2) Which candidate do you 
think would win if the election was today? 3) Which candidate would you vote for if the election 
was today? The pollsters discovered that while more of the participants thought Clinton would 
win, most actually planned on voting for Trump. Their approach differed from other polls in that 
they adjusted their data so it would represent the diversity of the population. 
There is good evidence to support the idea that for many Trump supporters their voting 
intentions differed from the ones they communicated to pollsters. Surely, this is not the first 
example of this phenomenon. The goal of my study was to model this more complex 
decision-making process and determine the extent to which it accurately predicts real-world 
political outcomes. 
 
Section 2: Opinion Dynamics Models 
 
Simulations that aim to reproduce the phenomenon of individual agents forming opinions 
over time via mutual influence are known as Opinion Dynamics models. They are ​computational 
realizations of the structural balance theory from Cartwright and Harary in 1956, where 
individuals’ opinions are influenced by “those with whom they share affective social ties” 
(Moore et al. 2015). These models draw upon concepts underlying Asch's famous experiments 
on opinion formation and conformity under social pressure (Asch 1955), and French's work on 
social power in networks (French 1956)​. 
 
Section 2.1 Binary Voter Model 
 
The Binary Voter Model (BVM) laid the initial foundation from which many other 
Opinion Dynamics models have been constructed (Clifford and Sudbury 1973; Holley and 
Liggett 1975). The BVM represents an artificial society of socially connected people. Individuals 
(in the terminology of Social Science Simulation, ​agents​) hold a single opinion, which can be 
one of two different values. In a political sense, an agent would be viewed as a Liberal or 
Conservative. 
The BVM simulates encounters between agents, some of whom are socially related to 
others. Periodically, a randomly chosen agent adopts the opinion of a neighboring agent if the 
two opinions differ. Over time, this always results in uniformity of opinion (Aldous and Fill 
2002, ch. 14). However, in the real world, we observe that society doesn’t always converge to 
uniformity. While the BVM is well-founded, the model is too simplistic to accurately reflect the 
dynamics of a real society’s opinions. As a result, researchers in the field of Opinion Dynamics 
have implemented a plethora of variations on the model. 
Originally, the social relations were depicted as a regular lattice, which means that agents 
were related to other agents in a predictable, uniform way. Subsequent variations to the model 
have depicted agents dispersed on an arbitrary graph.  
Other extensions were discovered to keep a society from converging on a single opinion. 
In one, Yildiz altered the BVM so that some agents in the graph never changed their opinion 
(Yildiz, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Saberi, Scaglione 2011). In the presence of only a few so-called 
stubborn agents​, this variation was determined to always resulted in a society of polarized 
opinions. 
A different extension of the BVM replaces the agent’s binary opinion value with a 
continuous one. If the difference of opinion between two agents is greater than a fixed threshold 
value, they won’t interact. Refused discussion is meant to represent a “lack of understanding, 
conflicting interest, or social pressure” (Weisbuch, Deffuant, Amblard, and Nadal 2001). If the 
threshold value is set low enough, two separate clusters of opinions will form. Agents will never 
interact with agents from the other cluster, and consensus of opinion will not be achieved.  
 
Section 3: The “Hidden Trump Model” 
 
In this thesis, I present the ​Hidden Trump Model ​(HTM), a novel extension to the 
Binary Voter Model. Every agent is assigned ​two​ binary opinion values, called ​expressed​ and 
latent​. Each of an agent’s opinions can take one of two possible values. For example, one 
interpretation is that an agent is either ‘pro-Trump’ or ‘anti-Trump’. 
An agent’s expressed opinion is the one he communicates that he believes in face-to-face 
social situations, while an agent’s latent opinion is the one that he truly believes. ​True believers 
are agents with identical expressed and latent opinions. Other agents, however, whose expressed 
and latent opinions differ, do not truly agree with the opinion they tell others they agree with. 
Agents interact in two different environments: online anonymously with strangers, and 
face-to-face with acquaintances. 
When an agent interacts anonymously, she will disclose her honest opinion without fear 
of judgment. Not all online interactions are anonymous, of course, but there is evidence to 
suggest that communicating online may lead to more open and “lively discussions as they 
plausibly allow participants to be anonymous and alleviate the hesitancy of those members 
holding the minority viewpoints to speak out” (Ho and McLeod 2008).  
When an agent interacts face-to-face, on the other hand, his true political affiliation may 
be hidden behind the facade of his expressed opinion. Studies have shown that fear of isolation 
and future opinion congruence are significantly related to willingness to express one’s own 
opinion (Ho and McLeod 2008). This model assumes that an agent may feign agreement with an 
associate if she perceives their opinions disagree. 
Face-to-face encounters, in addition to possibly modifying what people may express, may 
also cause them to change their latent opinion. Thus, during an interaction, if two agents’ 
expressed opinions already match, one of the two may “internalize” that opinion and become a 
true believer. Note that this aspect of the model causes the two variables to be intertwined -- 
without it, the model would reduce to two (predictably behaving) independent BVM processes. 
These two styles of interaction represent idealized poles on a spectrum from fully 
anonymous to directly face-to-face. Not all real-life interactions are at one of these extremes, of 
course. All models are simplifications of reality, however, and the HTM approximates the 
continuum of interaction types with these two representative processes. In particular, I am 
modeling “online” interactions as “fully anonymous,” which of course is a generalization of 
real-life communications. 
What will result when multiple agents behave according to these two processes is 
non-obvious, and the focus of my thesis.  
 
Section 4: The Hidden Trump Model in its Extremes 
 
The influence of the two processes can be characterized by three probabilities. The 
impact of the online process is controlled by the ​update probability​ (​i.e.​ the probability an agent 
will change his/her latent opinion to mimic the encountered agent’s latent opinion, if they don’t 
already match). The effect of the face-to-face process is determined by two probabilities. The 
first is the ​peer pressure probability​ (​i.e.​ the probability an agent will change his/her expressed 
opinion to imitate the other agent’s expressed opinion, if they disagree). Note that this is 
asymmetric: the “anti-Trump” opinion is the socially acceptable one, and peer pressure always 
exerts itself in that direction. The second is the ​internalize probability​ (​i.e​. the probability an 
agent will change his/her latent opinion to match his/her expressed opinion). This probability 
only comes into play when the two agents agree externally. These three key parameters can each 
be adjusted in the range 0 to 1. 
It is interesting to consider what behavior the model will exhibit when each of these 
parameters is set to an extreme value -- 0 or 1. Obviously, if all three probabilities are set to 0, 
the agents’ opinions never change (see table, case 000). 
 









000 0 0 0 All interactions are ineffective 
Static latent and expressed opinions 
001 0 0 1 Two ineffective processes 
Static expressed opinions, which latent 
eventually matches 
010 0 1 0 Ineffective online process 
Static latent opinions 
Single BVM (on expressed attribute) 
with graph neighbors 
011 0 1 1 Ineffective online process 
Expressed and latent opinions reach 
uniformity 
100 1 0 0 Ineffective face-to-face process 
Static expressed opinions 
Single BVM (on latent attribute) with 
mean field 
101 1 0 1 Society based solely on online social 
influence 
Effective online process 
 
Static expressed opinions 
Latent opinions polarize 
110 1 1 0 Two independent effective processes 
Two single BVMs (on expressed and 
latent) 
111 1 1 1 Full influence of HTE 
Two dependent effective processes 
 
When only the internalize probability is set to 1 (see table, case 001), both online and 
face-to-face encounters are unsuccessful. If an agent meets another with whom he externally 
disagrees, nothing will happen. However, as soon as he interacts with an agent with whom he 
shares an expressed opinion, he will permanently change his latent opinion to match his 
expressed opinion. As the simulation runs, the expressed opinions of agents on the graph are 
never influenced and the latent opinions of agents update once to reflect the agent’s expressed 
opinion. 
When only the​ ​peer pressure probability is turned on (see table, case 010), the 
face-to-face process functions as a single Binary Voter Model on the expressed attribute with 
graph neighbors, which will eventually reach uniformity of expressed opinion. Since the online 
process is always unsuccessful, latent opinions remain static throughout the simulation. 
When the face-to-face process is turned on (i.e. the peer pressure probability​ ​and 
internalize probability​ ​are set to 1), but the online process is turned off (i.e. update probability is 
set to 0), the graph will soon reach uniformity of the ‘anti-Trump’ opinion (see table, case 011). 
Expressed opinions of agents in the graph will steadily reach uniformity with latent opinions of 
agents following soon after. Initially, the majority of latent opinions may progress toward 
‘pro-Trump’, but as soon as all the expressed ‘pro-Trump’ opinions die out, all the external 
‘anti-Trump’ opinions will become internalized by agents. 
When only update probability is set to 1 (see table, case 100), the online process 
functions as a single Binary Voter Model on the latent attribute with Mean Field. Since the 
face-to-face process is always unsuccessful, expressed opinions stay static and there is no 
influence of the HTE. Agents only interact online sharing their latent opinions with others. The 
latent opinions of the agents on the graph will eventually reach uniformity of opinion. 
When the internalization probability and update probability are both turned on (see table, 
case 101), agents on the graph are only successfully influenced by other agents that they interact 
with anonymously through the online process. Without peer pressure influencing the face-to-face 
process, expressed opinions remain half ‘pro-Trump’ and half ‘anti-Trump’ throughout the 
simulation. Whenever two agents with the same expressed opinion interact face-to-face, the 
victim agent will internalize that shared opinion. Without the influence of the internalize 
probability, the online process would function as a single BVM and reach uniformity of latent 
opinion. However, because the internalize probability is set to 1, agents in the graph never 
converge on a single latent opinion. This combination of the probabilities depicts how a society, 
completely reliant on online communication, will result in agents with polarized latent opinions. 
A society polarized by opinion can never reach uniformity of opinion. 
When only the internalize probability is turned off (see table, case 110), the two 
processes operate independently. The face-to-face process functions as a single Binary Voter 
Model on the expressed attribute and influencers are sampled from an agent’s graph neighbors. 
Agents whose expressed opinions are ‘pro-Trump’ always conform when they encounter agents 
who hold ‘anti-Trump’ expressed opinion. As a result, expressed opinions quickly reach 
uniformity. The online process functions as a single Binary Voter Model on the latent attribute 
and influencers are sampled from the mean field. Latent opinions reach uniformity at a slower 
rate than expressed opinions.  
When all three probabilities are turned on (see table, case 111), the face-to-face and 
online processes are dependent on one another. The desire to express the socially acceptable 
opinion has complete influence over the expressed opinions of the agents in the graph. Those 
expressed opinions will be internalized if the agent agrees externally with another agent during a 
face-to-face interaction. As a result, all expressed opinions become ‘anti-Trump’ and hidden 
opinions eventually follow. Not only is there an ongoing pressure from the internalize probability 
make latent opinions reflect expressed opinions, but an unbiased BVM process is influencing 
latent opinions as well.  
 
Section 5: Results 
 
There are four parameters to the Hidden Trump Model: graph density, update probability, 
peer pressure probability, and internalize probability. The influence of these parameters can be 
measured with the difference between an opinion poll (where the society of agents is the sample 
population) and the results of the election (where the society is the voting population). If a 
pollster asked every agent for their opinion, they would share their expressed opinion. However, 
agents in private voting booths would vote according to their true (latent) opinions. Poll bias is a 
term that represents the difference between the percentage points a poll reports for a candidate 
and the amount of votes that candidate actually receives in the election. I compute this value 
using the number of ‘pro-Trump’ expressed and latent opinions. The more agents who express 
‘anti-Trump’ but believe ‘pro-Trump’ the higher a society’s poll bias will be. 
For each of the four parameters, I measure its influence on the graph, while keeping the 
other parameters constant. I ran 50 simulations for each and recorded the maximum poll bias. 
 
Graph Density 
The density of a graph is defined as the number of connections between agents divided 
by the number of potential connections between agents. Initializing a random graph requires a 
probability of connection between agents. As the probability increases, agents have a larger 
social circle. Of the two processes, only the Face-to-Face process is influenced by this 
probability, because agents only interact with agents they are connected to. 
The other three probabilities are held constant at 0.5. 
 
This model suggests that poll bias is not affected by the size of an agent’s social circle. 
 
Peer Pressure Probability 
The peer pressure probability is an essential component of the Face-to-Face process. 
As the probability increases, agents are more likely to succumb to peer pressure and modify their 
expressed opinion. 
Internalize probability and update probability are held constant at 0.5, while the density 




This model suggests that even the influence of a mild peer pressure environment can 
cause a significant poll bias to occur.  
 
Internalize Probability 
The internalize probability is the other essential component to the Face-to-Face process. 
As the probability increases, agents are more likely to change their latent opinion to match their 
expressed opinion. 
Peer pressure probability and update probability are held constant at 0.5, while the 





This model suggests that as this probability and poll bias are negatively correlated: as 
internalize probability increases, poll bias decreases. Agents are more aggressively copying their 
expressed opinion to become their real opinion; in short, agents are being more honest. This 
model shows that a high poll bias can occur if agents, who support the candidate with stigma, 
experience stronger internal resistance toward supporting the other candidate even if they’re 
saying they do. 
 
Update Probability 
The update probability is sole component to the Online process. As the probability 
increases, agents are more likely to change their latent opinion to match the other’s agent’s 
opinion during anonymous interactions. 
Peer pressure probability and internalize probability are held constant at 0.5, while the 




This model suggests that poll bias is not affected by this probability. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this model suggests that poll bias is not actually affected by people’s 
interaction frequencies. Getting people to interact more online or expand their social circles 
won’t prevent inaccurate polls. Instead, the solution to poll bias is people having less resistance 
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